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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1316 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
v. 
 
HARRY K. ROCHE, 
     
   Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-13-cr-00060-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 3, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 10, 2016) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 Appellant Harry Roche requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated as a 
consequence of the District Court’s failure to give warnings required by Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Because Roche’s claim of Rule 11 error was not 
preserved by timely objection, the plain-error standard of Rule 52(b) applies, along with 
its requirement to prove effect on substantial rights.  We must decide whether the District 
Court committed plain error when advising Roche of his rights to present evidence at trial 
and to be represented by counsel throughout his case.  We conclude that any such error 
on behalf of the District Court was not plain because Roche has not shown it affected his 
plea.  Accordingly, for the reasons discussed herein, we will affirm. 
I.  
A federal grand jury returned a five-count Superseding Indictment charging Roche 
with production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e) 
(Count One); two counts of transportation of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2252A(a)(l)–(2) and (b)(1), and 2256(2)(A) and (8)(A) (Counts Two and Three); 
possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), 
and 2256(2)(A) and (8)(A) (Count Four); and committing a felony offense involving a 
minor while subject to registration as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A 
(Count Five).  On March 4, 2014, Roche entered into a plea agreement with the 
Government and pleaded guilty to Counts One and Two.   
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During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, Roche confirmed that he had “fully discussed 
[the] charges and the case in general with [his] attorney” and was “fully satisfied with the 
counsel, representation, and advice” given to him.  App. 29.  The District Court then 
advised Roche of his right to plead not guilty and his right to the assistance of counsel.  
The District Court also explained the Government’s burden and the elements of each 
offense, after which Roche admitted that he engaged in the underlying conduct.  Roche 
stated that he did not disagree with any of the Government’s factual representations and 
entered a plea of guilty to Counts One and Two.  At no point did Roche object to the 
District Court’s plea colloquy.  On January 21, 2015, the District Court conducted a 
sentencing hearing and sentenced Roche to a term of 420 months on Count One and 180 
months on Count Two, to be served concurrently.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because it is undisputed that Roche lodged no objection to the 
plea colloquy at issue, we review the purported Rule 11 violation for plain error.  United 
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58–59 (2002).  Under the plain error standard, in the context 
of a Rule 11 error, Roche must “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he 
would not have entered the [guilty] plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 
74, 83 (2004).  In other words, Roche must demonstrate “that the probability of a 
different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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III. 
 We are confident that the outcome of the proceedings below were not affected by 
the Rule 11 plea colloquy in this case.  On appeal, Roche contends that the District Court 
failed to inform him of (1) his right to present evidence at trial, Rule 11(b)(1)(E); (2) his 
right to counsel at every other stage of the case, Rule 11(b)(1)(D); and (3) his right to 
appointed counsel at every other stage of the case, Rule 11(b)(1)(D).  Although the 
District Court did not explicitly inform Roche of all these specific rights, a review of the 
record persuades us that Roche sufficiently understood his rights, and that he has not 
shown he would have declined to plead guilty had a more extensive colloquy been 
conducted. 
 As an initial matter, we find the Rule 11 plea colloquy in this case sufficiently 
informed Roche of his right to present evidence.  The District Court specifically asked 
Roche whether he understood he had the right to voluntarily testify in his defense, and “to 
compel the attendance of witnesses to testify in [his] behalf.” App. 36.  Roche stated that 
he understood he had these rights.  In light of Roche’s acknowledgment of these rights, 
we are unpersuaded by his argument that the District Court failed to inform him of his 
right to present evidence at trial as required by Rule 11(b)(1)(e).  
 With respect to Rule 11(b)(1)(D), however, we find that the District Court failed 
to explicitly inform Roche of his right to appointed counsel at all stages of the 
proceedings.  Nevertheless, although this lapse contravened Rule 11, the record does not 
suggest there was a reasonable probability that, absent this error, Roche would not have 
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pled guilty. Cf. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83.  To the contrary, the record suggests 
Roche was aware of his rights and would have pled guilty regardless of the error.   
 Indeed, the District Court specifically asked Roche if he understood that he had 
“the right to the assistance of an attorney for [his] defense.”  App. 36.  Again, Roche 
stated that he understood he had this right.  The fact that Roche was represented by 
appointed counsel at the time he entered his plea suggests he was aware of his right to 
appointed representation in criminal proceedings.  Moreover, the fact that the same 
appointed counsel is now representing Roche on appeal further suggests he was aware of 
his right to appointed counsel at all stages of the proceedings.   
 After reviewing the record, we do not find that any Rule 11 error affected Roche’s 
decision to plead guilty in light of the incriminating evidence presented by the 
Government; the District Court’s almost complete recitation of Roche’s most pertinent 
rights; the fact that Roche was represented by appointed counsel during the plea hearing 
and before this Court; and the fact that Roche received a concession from the 
Government to dismiss Count Five of his Indictment—which would have increased his 
total mandatory sentence by a total of ten years.  Overall, we are not persuaded by 
Roche’s conclusory assertion that the circumstances in this case make it reasonably 
probable that he would not have entered a guilty plea, and we are confident that the 
outcome of the proceeding was not affected by the Rule 11 plea colloquy in this case. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.  
